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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE IKSURANCE FUND, 
administered by the Commission of 
Finance of Utah, 
Petiti-oner and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELBERT I. LUNNEN and THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
No. 7274 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Elbert I. Lunnen worked as a blacksmith and welder 
for Lundin & May Foundry and Machine Company in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for a period of 22 years, from 
,January, 1926, to February 7, 1948. During most of that 
tiine he was exposed to the smoke and fumes which ca~e 
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from the fluxes and welding rods which were used in 
the "\velding processes. During the last 5 or 6 years of 
his work he noticed a difficulty in breathing, and he 
mentioned it several times to his employer. He found 
it necessary to lay off work for short periods of ~time, 
particularly after he had been welding on bronze. Fin-
ally his condition become so bad that he could not work 
any longer; so he quit working on February 8, 1948, and 
has not been able to work since that date. 
On August 5, 1948, Mr. Lunnen filed a written appli-
catioi_l for compensation with the Industrial Commission 
in which he specified that he had received injuries by 
inhaling the fumes, sn1oke an~ gases from the fluxes 
and welding rods and the coke used in the forge. This 
application was made on a form which the Industrial 
Commission uses in _accidental injury cases; so Mr. Lun-
nen later filed his elaim with the Industrial Commission 
on Septe1nber 18, 1948, on an occupational disease clain1 
forin. 
The Industrial Commission held a hearing on Oc-
tober 6, 1948, and rendered i~ts decision on November 
8, 1948, awarding compensation benefits to Mr. Lunnen 
under the Occupational Disease Law. The State Insur-
ance Fund, the employer's worlanen's compensation and 
occupational disease insurance carrier, filed a timely 
application for rehearing, which the Industrial Commis-
sion denied on Nove1nber 18, 1948. The_ State Insurance 
Fund, which is administered by ~the Commission of Fi-
na!lce, has brought· the ·case to the Supreme Court of 
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Utah for revie,v. In this brief "~e shall refer to the re-
porter's transcript of the evidence as Tr. 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
The question of most importance in this case is 
"~hether :ftir. Lunnen filed his written application with 
the Industrial Con11nission ·w·ithin the required time 
specified in the Occupational Disease Law. 
ARGUMENT 
,, ... e shall assume, for the purpose of this discus~ion, 
that ~Ir. Lunnen established by competent evidence that 
he becan1e totally disabled as ~the result of several years' 
exposure to poisonous and irritating smoke and fumes in 
his ,,~ork at the Lundin & May plant. 
. . 
POINT 1 
~IR. LUNNEN'S APPLICATION FOR COMPEN-
SATION \VAS NOT FILED WITH THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN THE REQUIRED 
PERIOD OF TIME AND WAS THEREFORE LE-
GALLY BARRED. 
Section 42-la-49 of the Occupational Disease Law 
provides: 
The right to compensation under this act for 
disability or death fron1 an occupational disease 
shall be forever barred unless written claim is 
filed with the commission within the time as in 
this seeti~on hereinafter provided: 
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(a) If the claim is made by an employee 
and based upon silicosis it must be filed within 
one year after the cause of action arises. 
(b) If the claim is made by an employee 
and based upon a disease other than silicosis it 
must he filed within sixty days after ~the cause 
of action arises, except in case of benzol or its 
derivities when it must be filed within ninety 
days. 
(c) (This subsection relates to death cases.) 
Mr. Lunnen's claim, after it was amended by his 
attorney, (Tr. 2 & 3), was undisputably based upon an 
occupational disease other :than silicosis, ·and· therefore 
comes within the provisions of the statutory limitation 
of subsection (b) above-quoted. The disputed point in 
this case involves the question, ''When does a cause of 
action arise in an occupational disease case~'' 
We might be willing to concede that Mr. Lunnen's 
first application of August 5, 1948, should be considered 
a proper written claim filed with the Industrial Com-
mission, even _though it was on a different form than is 
customarily used in occupational disease ·cases. But that 
would not help him any. August 5, 1948, is almost six 
months after the day Mr. Lunnen's total disability ·com-
menced on February 8, 1948. He was required to file 
his claim within 60 days after his cause of action arose. 
Among other things, ~the Industrial Commission's 
decision contained the following findings: 
* * * * 
I I 
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"he 'Yas expo~ed during this period to harmful 
quantities of poisonous fu1nes containing phos-
phorus. 1nanganese. rhloride and rhrome; that on 
February 8, 1948, he quit his job because he "vas 
physirally unable to ''"ork; that he consulted doc-
tors Bauerline and Hatch 'vho advised him to 
quit 'York and go to Arizona; that no complete 
diag·nosis 'Yas made at this time ~to the applicant; 
that the applicant became dissatisfied with the 
prog-ress made in his recovery and on July 9, 
1948, went to see Dr. Vernon Stevenson. Follow-
ing a complete physical examination of the appli-
cant and the x-rays taken of ~the applicant, Dr. 
Stevenson found on July 28, 1948, that the appli-
cant was totally disabled as a result of exposure 
to poisonous fumes arising out of or in the course 
of his employment; that the cause of aetion in 
this case arose on July 28, 1948, when a complete 
diagnosis was made by Dr. Vern on Stevenson of 
this case and a finding was made; that applicant 
was physically unable to continue his work be-
cause of this occupational disease he had incurred 
due to his exposure to poison fumes during his 
employment from January, 1926, Ito February, 
1948, by Lundin and May Foundry and Machine 
Company; that the applicant filed a claim for 
compensation with the Industrial Commission on 
September 18, 1948, and is within the statute of 
limitations for filing his claim.'' 
The Commission's finding, or conclusion, that Mr. 
Lunnen's cause of action arose on July 28, 1948, was 
the basic error in the Commission's decision. 
It is our contention that Mr. Lunnen's cause of ac-
tion arose on February 8, 1948, the date when he became 
totally disabled, and since \vhich date he has been con-
tinuously totally disabled. 
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No occupational disease case has ever come to the 
Supreme Court of Utah prior to this, in which was in-
volved a question relating to when the cause of action 
arose, so far as we are aware. Neither have we been 
able to find any occupational disease case from any 
other s~tate which involved the exact wording of the 
Statute of Limitations contained in Section 49 of the 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
When this matter was pending before the Industrial 
Commission a Memorandum of Authorities was submit-
ted by Mr. Lunnen's attorney at that time. He likewise 
apparently was unable to find any case which involved 
a Statute of Limitations containing the same wording 
as that found in our Occupational Disease Law. 
What are the necessary elements which give an em-
ployee a "·cause of action" under the Utah Occupati,onal 
Disease Daw~ They are enumerated in Section. 42-la-13, 
as follows: 
(a) There is imposed upon every employer 
a liability for the payment of compensation to 
every employee who becomes totally disabled by 
reason of an occupational disease subject to the 
following conditions : 
(1) No compensation shall be paid 'vhen the 
last day of injurious exposure of the employee to 
the hazards of said occupational diseases shall 
have occurred prior to the effective date of this 
act. 
· (2) No compensation shall be paid for a 
disea.-se other than silicosis unless total disability 
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results within one hundred t"~enty days from the 
last day upon "~hich the employee actually worked 
for the en1ployer against "rhon1 con1pensation is. 
claiined. 
( 3) (This subsection relates to silicosis 
'vhich is not here involved.) 
(4) No claim shall be maintained nor com-
pensation paid unless the claint has been filed 
'Yith the co1n1nission in 'vriting within the time 
fLxed by the appropriate subdivision of Section 
49 of this act. 
(The rest of the Section relates to death 
cases.) 
Applying all these provisions to Mr. Lunnen's claim: 
First, he must have had exposure to harmful sub-
stances in the 'vork done for his employer in the period 
bet\Yeen July 1, 1941, and February 7, 1948. 
~ext, he must have become totally disabled as the 
result of that exposure and such total disability must 
have connne:r:tced within 120 days after February 7, 1948, 
'Yhich \Yas the last day of such exposure. In other words, 
his total disability must have commenced on or before 
June 6, 1948. 
Next, he n1ust have filed his written claim with the 
Industrial Commission within 60 days after his cause of 
action arose. 
\V"i th respect to the exposure, the evidence in the 
record is ample to satisfy that requirement. vVith re-
~pect to the time when his total disability commenced, 
\V€>, have already stated that the record sho,vs Mr. Lunnen 
h<'eatne totallly disabled February 8, 1948. Inasn1uch as 
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his attorney has filed an Answer to our Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, in which Answer he alleges that the record 
does not establish whether Mr. Lunnen \vas totally dis-
abled on February 8, 1948, or at some later date, we 
shall quote a few portions of ~the testimony given by 
Mr. Lunnen, himself. In both of his applications Mr. 
Lunnen stated that he left \Vork on February 8, 1948, 
and that he continued to be totally disabled from that 
day until the date he filed each application. Then in 
his testimony (Tr. 9 & 10) he stated that the smoke and 
fun1es which were given off during welding operations 
were so unpleasant and irritating that he was unable 
to stay \Yith it for more than half an hour at a time and 
that he had complained to his employer about this con-
dition several times during the 4 or 5 years previous to 
his quitting \Vork. At Tr. 10 he testified as follows: 
Q. What brought you to make that com-
plaint~ 
A. Well, on a particular bronze job, I had 
to do an acetylene b~onze job, and I told the boss 
at the time that it was getting too much for me. 
Q. Was there anything in your physical con-
dition that made you arrive at that conclusion~ 
A. Just your lungs, you get so you can taste 
it in your food at night. 
Q. That was about four or five years ago 
you made that complaint~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. I will ask you whether you have noticed 
any difficulty in breathing, and whether you did 
at that time. 
A. This was coming on for five or six years, 
difficulty in breathing. 
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Q. ''Then you noticed this difficulty in 
breathing. you con1plained to your Pinployer 1 
~-\. I ha Ye told thPn1 tiine and again. 
Q. I "·ill ask y ~1u \Yhether or not in the last 
fe\Y ytlnrs it has been· necessary for you to lay 
off \York for short periods of tin1e )? 
:\. Yes. 
Q. ,,~hat period J? 
.1.\. EYery time I w'ould "·eld on bronz_e I 
,,~ould haYe to lay off three to eight days. 
He further testified that after he quit \vorking Feb-
ruary 8, 1948, he consulted Drs. Bauerline and Hatch, 
\Yho told him to quit his \York and go to Arizona. He 
then went to the office of the Industrial Commission 
w·here he \Yas supplied \Yith certain forms, one set of 
them yellow and the other set white. (Tr. 11, 12, 29 & 30.) 
He took the yellow forms to the office of Drs. Bauerline 
and Hatch, but kept the white forms at his home. Ap-
parently the white forms were the blanks upon which 
he could have made his claim to the Industrial Conl-
mission, although that was not clearly brought out in 
the hearing. On the back of the form filed by him on 
Septen1ber 18, 1948, he stated "I was forced to quit 
work on February 8, 1948, because of my illness." He 
also testified, ( Tr. 29) : 
Q. You say you went to Doctors Hatch and 
Bauerline in February, 1948~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the purpose of going there~ 
A. To find out about my lungs. 
Q. They were giving you trouble at that 
time~ 
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A. Yes, that is ~the reason I quit work alto-
gether. . 
Q. The condition of your lungs made is nec-
essary for you to quit work February 8, 1948~ 
A. Yes. 
and at (Tr. 30): 
A. In there they handed me two different 
papers, and I took one set of papers home. 
Q. What did it say on them~ 
A. I don't know. I took the three yellow' 
ones up to the clinic but they never filled them 
out. 
MR. RAMPTON: That was to Dr. Bauer-
line~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Doctor Bauerline tell you why~ 
A. He told me that I had to stay out of that. 
Q. You w.ere aware at that time that your 
disability was probably caused by your employ-
ment~ 
A. Yes, I had known it for a long while. 
* * * * 
Q. \Vhat -did Dr. Bauerline tell you was the 
cause of it' 
A. Dr. Bauerline said it vvas caused over a 
period of years and the condition of ~the place 
where I worked. 
In Mr. Lunnen's attorney's Men1orandum filed with 
the Industrial Commission, he argued that the 60-day 
Statute of Limitations should not commence to run in 
this case until Mr. Lunnen was informed by Dr. Steven-
son on July 28, 1948, that his disability was caused 
fro1n injury to his lungs and diaphram, which Dr. 
Corey's x-ray and Dr. Stevenson's diagnosis determined 
were the results of inhalation of gases from the welding 
' 
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operations 0ontaining phosphorus, manganese, chloride 
and chro1ne. The Industrial Commission apparently ac-
cepted that theory as the basis for i~ts finding and con-
clusion that Mr. Lunnen 's cause of action arose within 
the required statutory period prior to the time he filed 
his claim. The Industrial Conunission 's decision, how-
ever, did not explain the date upon which !tlr. Lunnen's 
cause of action arose. The evidence we have quoted 
clearly showed that he knew that the gases and fumes 
and smoke from the welding operations at his employer's 
plant were causing him to have lung difficulty and other 
physical troubles for several years prior to the date 
when he finally quit work; and he also knew that these 
lung troubles and other physical difficulties were the 
cause of his inability to further continue his work. 
On the general subject of when does a cause of ac-
tion arise, we briefly quote the following : 
34 American Jurisprudence, p. 92, §113: 
It may be stated as a sound general proposi-
tion that a cause of action accrues the moment the 
right to commence an action comes into existence, 
and the statute of limitations commences to run 
f~om that time even though, in some jurisdictions, 
the party is ignorant as to the existence of his 
rights or the cause of action is fraudulently con-
cealed. As the rule is otherwise expressed, a right 
of action accrues whenever such a breach of duty 
or ·contract has occurred, or such a wrong has 
been sustained, as will give a right to bring and 
sustain a suit. Conversely, ~the right to eommence 
an action arises the moment the cause of action 
accrues. In the absence of a statute to the con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
itrary, the test in each ~ase is wh~the; the pa:ty 
asserting a claim is entitled to maintain an achon 
to enforce it, for no limitation commences to run 
against any demand until ~the obligation or de-
nland is due and payable, in the sense that it is 
defined sufficiently to be capable of enforcement. 
(See Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 
25 Pac. (2nd) 952, 82 Utah 475.) 
86 A. L. R. 574: 
The decision that the statute begins to run 
only when the disease culminates in actual dis-
ability is also strongly supported by other cases 
not turning upon that point, but holding, like 
Johnson's Case ( 1914) 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 
735, 4NCCCA 843, and Bergeron's Case (1923) 
243 Ma$S. 366, 137 N. E. 739, that injury to a 
workman who had for years been gradually ab-
sorbing a poison into his system while working, 
but did not quit work until it 1nade him so sick 
that he had to stop, V\ras not received until he 
finally quit. 
54 Corpus Juris Secundum, pages 11 & 12, 
§109: 
A cause or right of action accrues, so as to 
start the Staute of Limitations running, when 
the right to institute and maintain a suit arises, 
and not before. 
* * * whenever one person may sue an-
other a cause of action has accrued and the Stat-
ute of Limitations begins to run * * *. 
The running of the statute, however, is not 
delayed until plaintiff can secure sufficient evi-
dence to maintain his aoti·on. 
On February 8, 1948, Mr. Lunnen was entitled to 
claim occupational disease compensation against his 
employer and its insurance carrier. Before that date 
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he did not have any cause of action (right to file a claim), 
against his en1ployer and its insurance c.arrier. February 
8, 1948, "Tas the first day on \Yhich all the necessary 
elements of an occupational disease case \Yere in exist-
ence and upon the basis of "Thieh Lunnen could have 
legally filed a clain1. Consequently, February 8, 1948, 
was the day \Yhen his case of action ''accrued'' or 
''arose,'' both of "\vhich \Yords mean the same thing 
insofar as they relate to a cause of action. 
\Vhile the \\Torkmen's Compensation Law of U:tah 
contains an entirely different Statute of Limitations 
than that contained in the Occupational Disease Law, 
(and the \\Torkmen's Compensation Law always did have 
a differently worded Statute of Limitations than the 
Occupational Disea.se Law), there is one case which was 
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah relating to a 
workman's compensation ·claim which conitains a state-
ment of basic rules relating to the Statute of Limitations 
which may be helpful to the Court in its consideration 
of the case at bar. We refer ~to Salt Lake 'C'ity vs. Indus-
tr·ial Commission, 74 Pac. (2nd) 657, 93 Utah 510. That 
case involved a situation which arose prior to the Legis-
lature's enactment of the present three-year Statute ~f 
Limitations found in the last sentence of Section 43-1-92 
of the Workmen's Compensation Law. We quote from 
93 Urtah, page 513 : 
"The (Workmen's) Compensation Act, Rev. 
St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq. imposes a duty on em-
ployers to pay compensation to employees who 
suffer disability from an injury by accident aris-
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ing out of or in the course of the employment. 
Not until there is an accident and injury and a 
disability or loss from the injury does the duty 
to pay arise. A mere accident does not impose the 
duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does 
not ilnpose the duty. But accident plus injury 
\Yhieh results in disability or loss gives rise to 
the duty to pay." -
It also could appropriately be said that the Occu-
pational Disease Law requires payn1ent of compensa-
tion benefits when there has been necessary exposure to 
the harn1ful substances, plus injury to the employee 
resulting from tha;t exposure, plus disability resulting 
fron1 8aid injury; \Vith the existence of all three of 
those elen1ents, the employee becomes entitled to make 
a claim for occupational disease con1pensation benefits. 
The Utah Occupational Disease Law does not con-
tain any provision relating to the employee using dili-
gence in obtaining a thorough medical diagnosis of his 
case, o·r learning the technical medical name of the par-
ticular disease which disables him, or obtaining ·the 
necessary medical evidence which he migh need to es-
tablish his claim. But rthe Occupational Disease Law 
does contain an absolute limitation of the time within 
which he n1ust file his written claim with the Industrial 
Con1mission in order for him to be entitled to the ~ene­
fits provided by the La-\v. 
The case of Cleveland vs. Laclede Christy Clay 
Products Company, 129 S. W. (2nd) 12, -"\vhich was de-
cided by the Missouri Court of Appeals in 1939, involved 
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the Statute of Linritations applicable to a claim for 
disability from silicosis. The Missouri workmen's com-
pensation la",. covers both accidental injuries and occu-
pational diseases, and in that respect differs fron1 Utah's 
statutes, in "\vhich the occupational disease law is a sep-
arate act. Ho,vever, this case has considerable similarity 
to the case at bar, even though they involve different 
occupational diseases. The Missouri Court said: 
"It is claimed by counsel for the claimant 
that his co-ndition was first discovered on J anu-
ary 7, 1937, follo,ving an x-ray examination on 
January 3, 1937. This was ~the date his physician 
informed him of the name of the disease from 
which he "'"as suffering, to wit: "silicosis." It is 
urged that this information was the first knowl-
edge he had that he was suffering from an occu-
pational disease, and it is further urged that he, 
because of learning the ·name of his lung trouble, 
filed his claim \vith the \\T orkmen 's C1ompensation 
Commission on January 28, 1937. Dr. Weinel, his 
physician had been treating him for the chest 
trouble for a long period of time, and \vhat claim-
ant knew prior to January 7, 1937, about his 
chest trouble was not added to by Dr. Weinel on 
that date by giving him the specific nan1e of 
''silicosis'' as the disease from which he suffered. 
The greatest poet has said, "What is in a name~ 
That which we call a rose, by any other name 
would smell as sweet.'' It cannot be seriously con-
sidered that his chest condition had materially 
changed immediately upon his knowledge of the 
name of ~the disease as gained from his physician. 
There is nothing in the Workmen's Comp~nsation 
Law indicating that the six months' statute of 
limitation does not begin to run until such time 
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as the employee may be ·told the technical name 
of his illness. (Cases cited.) According to his 
own testimony, claimant knew more than six 
n1onths prior to the filing of his claim, that he had 
this trouble in his chest and that he had been 
trea~ted for it. He knew that the chest trouble 
\vas the cause of his inability to do his full ·work 
and that the nature of the \\·ork aggravated this 
condition. 
* * * * 
It is set out in 37 Corpus Juris, p. 969, as 
follo,vs : '' * * * mere ignorance of the facts 
\vhich constitute the cause of action will not post-
pone the operation of the statute of limitations, 
but the statute will run from the time the cause 
of action first accrues notwithstanding such ig-
norance.'' 
In the case of Universal Granite Qua:rries Co. vs. 
Ind. C'omm., 272 N. W. 863, 224 Wis. 680: 
''It is quite true the claimant knew nothing 
about silicosis, but he kne"'\\r about stone dust and 
thought that was the -cause of his difficulty. He 
did not understand fully the physiological action 
of stone dust in 1930 and 1931, he probably does 
not understand it yet, but he knew that s~tone dust 
was causing his trouble and must have known that 
stone dust was connected with his employment 
for he had worked for 40 years at the same kind 
of work. * * * Failing ~to make claim for 
compensation within two years from the time 
when he became aware of his condition and the 
cause of it, his claim is barred. '' 
In the case of Brown vs. St. Joseph Lead Co., 87 
Pac. (2nd) 1000, 60 Idaho 39, the Court's opinio~ holds 
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that the accident sustained by a lode mine employee who 
contracted silicosis was completed 'vhen the disease be-
came so bad that the employee was forced to cease work-
ing, and the one-year period "~ithin 'vhich claim for com-
pensation 1nust be filed under the \Vorkmen 's Compen-
sation Act began to run from such date. The reason this 
case comes under the \V orkmen 's Compensation Act is 
because Idaho's act covers both accidental injuries and 
occupational diseases. 
In both the case of Agostin vs. Pittsburgh Steel 
Foundry Corp., 47 Atl. (2nd) 680, 354 Pa. 543, and in 
Stewart vs. Lakey Foundry & Machine Co.., 18 N. W. 
(2nd) 895, 311 Mich. 463, it was held that ~the right to 
compensation for disability from exposure to silica dust 
commenced when the employee quit working and that 
was the date of his total disability. 
We are willing to admi~t that the 60-day or the 90-
day limitation periods provided by the terms of Section 
42-1a-49, appear to be somewhat inadequate in certain 
circumstances. We. do not know why the Legislature 
provided a limitation period of one year within which 
an employee might file a claim with the Industrial Com-
mission based upon silicosis and in the same section 
of the Law provided only a 60-day limitation period in 
cases such as that of Mr. Lunnen's and a 90-day period in 
claims involving disability from exposure to benzol or its 
derivitives. Regardless of what reasons the Legislature 
had in providing those par~ticular limitation periods for 
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those particular types of cases, we are boun·d by the Leg-
islative enactment. There p-robably are several provisions 
of the Occupational Disease Law which the Legislature 
should amend and which we would be willing to discuss 
and recommend before the proper tribunal, namely the 
Legislature or some of its committees. 
~[r. Lunnen's physical and financial condition are 
such as to merit considerable sympathy and generosity. 
However, the Supreme Court of U tab many years ago 
declared that none of the officials charged with the ad-
nlinistration of the State Insurance Fund has any legal 
po,ver or authority to waive the Statute of Limitations 
or any other valid defense which the Fund may have. 
in a compensati_on case. 
Taslich vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah· 
33, 262 Pac. 281. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. vs. Industrial Comr 
mission, 58 Utah 608, 201 Pac. 173. 
For the foregoing reasons the award of the Indus-
trial Commission should be annulled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
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